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                  Abstract   1/5/03 
 
The pensions industry is a multi – billion euro industry world wide. As at December 
2002, Irish pension fund assets under management (not including the Government 
Pension reserve Fund) were of the order of 50,618.5m. Euro. Recent stock market 
performances coupled with a number of high – profile corporate failures have focussed 
attention on the vulnerabilities of funded pension systems. This paper looks at the role of 
funded occupational pension schemes in Ireland and specifically at the risks inherent in 
both the investment strategies of these schemes and the institutional structure of pension 
fund provision. It questions whether pension funds by embracing these risks are serving 
the objectives of the individual beneficiaries of the schemes, the trustees and the sponsor 
companies. 
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Focus of  paper 
 
This paper looks at the role of occupational funded pension schemes in Ireland, in the 
provision of pensions. It specifically looks at the risks associated with these schemes, 
from institutional risk to investment strategy risk. Most academic discussion of risk 
focuses on market risk, in particular risk from equity investment.  This paper however 
argues that risk also flows from the institutional structure of pension fund provision. The 
paper concludes that the “secure investment” tag, traditionally associated with pension 
scheme arrangements may be too simplistic due to a variety of risk factors. 
 
Introduction 
 
The forecast increase in the cost of old age pension provision and possible future 
difficulties in funding pensions in many countries, is at this stage well documented. 
“Rapid demographic transitions caused by rising life expectancy and declining fertility 
mean that the proportion of old people in the general population is growing rapidly” 
(World Bank-1994 –Foreword). Changing labour markets, in particular reduced 
participation in the labour force by males over 50 (Disney, 1996 p. 193, p. 225) due to 
early retirement and/or disability also contributes to the dependency ratio. In most 
developing countries, an informal system whereby children care for their aged parents 
and income transfers flow between generations in both directions, is still the mainstay of 
provision in old age. But in many countries, economic development has resulted in the 
informal arrangements giving way to formal market arrangements and to varying degrees, 
mandatory government programmes (World Bank, 1994, ch.2).    
 
The widely referred to report by the World Bank (1994) “Averting the Old Age Crisis – 
Policies to Protect the old and Promote growth”, identifies in its overview, three 
functions of old age security systems – redistribution, saving and insurance. The study 
suggests that financial security for the old and economic growth would be better served if 
Governments developed three systems or “pillars” of old age security; a publicly 
managed system with mandatory participation and a limited goal of reducing poverty 
among the old (social security pension), a privately managed mandatory savings system 
(a pension plan either a personal savings or occupational plan), and voluntary savings (a 
personal savings or occupational pension plan).  One of these policies, the development 
of privately managed funded pensions, has also been  advocated by Governments, the 
European Commission and the pensions industry in many countries, including Ireland.   
 
In developed countries and most low and middle- income countries, Governments have 
developed formal pension arrangements to some degree. Key to the type and nature of 
each system is Government policy on a number of policy issues viz: 
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 Whether primary reliance should be on voluntary or mandatory mechanisms; 
 The replacement rates built into the design of social security and private pension 
benefits; 
 The balance to be attained between poverty alleviation and redistribution, saving and 
income smoothing. 
 What elements of insurance should be provided. 
 How the system should be financed – funded or on a pay as you go basis. 
 Should the system be managed publicly or privately. 
 
The current pattern across Europe and the US is summarised in the Table (1) below: 
 
Table 1 
 
Ireland Social security old age contributory and non – contributory 
pension. Voluntary employer provided occupational pension 
arrangements – largely defined benefit. Private personal pensions 
also available.  
UK.  Low level of State pension, complemented by voluntary employer 
provided, defined benefit funded system. Private personal 
pensions also available. 
Sweden  Minimum State pension, complemented by publicly managed 
mandatory defined contribution system. Also large and unified 
voluntary occupational pension and personal pensions sector.  
Norway Flat rate State pension complemented by mandatory earnings 
related defined benefit public pension for entire workforce. Fairly 
large voluntary occupational pension and personal pension sector. 
Denmark Means tested basic pension. Mandatory small flat – rate 
contributory pension in the private sector. Large fragmented 
occupational and personal pensions sector. 
Netherlands Transition from a mandatory public scheme to a voluntary 
privatised one. 
France Compulsory defined benefit pay as you go system. 
USA Compulsory three tier plan for all federal employees – basic 
social security, a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution 
plan. In the private sector defined contribution plans (401(k)) are 
by far the most popular  
  
 
Source: Reynard et al.  eds,  (1996 p.16-23, p.40-48, p.127-136, p.154-162, p221-231), Hughes and 
Stewart,eds, (2000 p.147-160,p.180-192)   
 
Currently about one in every four persons and more than one third of the working age 
population in OECD countries are covered by an occupational pension. In Ireland, 
coverage of those in employment, aged 20  to 65 stands at approximately 50% (CSO) and 
is increasing. The pensions industry is a multi–billion euro industry world wide. As at 
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December 2002, assets managed on behalf of Irish pension funds stood at 50,618.5 
million euro (IAPF, 2003)). 
 
As at December 2000, there were 86,348 pension schemes registered with the Irish 
Pension Board with a total membership of 629,801. Of this, 180,690 individuals were 
members of defined contribution schemes while there were 449,111 members of defined 
benefit schemes. The trend however is towards defined contribution schemes with a 
significant number of one- member schemes being registered during 2000.   Table (2) 
gives more information on the members of occupational pension schemes. 
 
Table 2 Members of Occupational Pension  Schemes Supervised by the Pensions Board 
 
year Members  
of  all  
pension 
schemesa 
 
‘000 
D.B. 
Only 
 
 
 
‘000 
D.C. 
Only 
 
 
 
‘000 
Pension 
fund 
assetsb 
 
Euro 
Billion 
Assets 
as  % 
of GDP 
Total at 
workc 
 
 
‘000 
Estimated 
pension 
coverage 
 
 
per cent 
2000 630 449   181 53.9    66  1710 36.8 
1995 478 405   78 20.8    50  1239 38.6 
 
Source: Connell, P. and Stewart, J. (forthcoming). 
 
Notes  
a - This data refers to occupational pension schemes and includes both public sector PAYG schemes as well 
as funded or partly funded schemes.  The data relates to members of pension schemes monitored by the 
Pensions Board.  Source: Various issues of Annual Report of the Pensions Board. 
b - Source: Shane Whelan, (2001) Irish pensions Funds: Size Growth and Composition of Assets, Dublin: 
Shane F. Whelan & Co.  
c - C.S.O.  Quarterly National Household Survey Sept- Nov. 2000, Feb. 2001 and 1995 National Labour 
Force Survey, 1996. 
  
 
Occupational Pension Schemes – Structure and Regulatory Framework. 
 
Occupational pension schemes are privately managed pension schemes offered by 
employers to some or all employees as part of an overall remuneration package. Often 
facilitated by tax concessions and regulated by Governments, their objective is to provide 
a targeted level of income on retirement in most situations complementing social 
security. 
 
Occupational pension schemes in Ireland are mainly set up as trusts. Accordingly, they 
are primarily governed by Trust law. However this is supplemented by the Pensions Act 
1990, and the Pensions Amendment Act, 1996. In addition, occupational pension 
schemes are subject to employment law, tax law, insurance law, social welfare law and 
more recently family law. 
 
Many schemes invest their funds and provide benefits through some form of insurance 
contract. At a minimum, certain contingencies, e.g. death or disability of members are 
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insured by the pension scheme. The standard type of  investment structure used is either a 
unit –linked insurance contract or  a with profit contract. In the unit linked arrangement, 
the scheme would buy units in one of the investment funds of the insurance company e.g. 
the Irish Equity fund, the fixed interest fund or perhaps a managed fund incorporating a 
broad mix of assets. The value of the scheme’s units would fluctuate with the value of the 
underlying fund. The assets in the underlying fund remain the property of the insurance 
company, the scheme’s assets are the units it holds in the fund. A with profit contract will 
to some extent guarantee a benefit at retirement equivalent to a specified rate of return. 
Where investment performance exceeds the rate guaranteed, the insurance company may 
declare an additional bonus, assuming assets invested earn above this minimum rate. 
However, in 2002 and so far in 2003 many with profit contracts have either not declared 
an additional bonus, or reduced projected payouts.(Prudential, Norwich Union, Standard 
Life, Legal & General and Scottish Widows.).  
 
The pension scheme could however manage it’s funds itself and not go the insurance 
route. Typically, in this situation, the scheme would place its funds with one or more fund 
managers having agreed in advance, investment strategies and key performance 
indicators.   
Accordingly the investment route might be represented as in Figure (1). 
Figure (1) 
Cash flows for pension 
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RISK FACTORS 
 
Institutional Risk 
 
Pension contracts are long term, a contract written now may not be exercised for 40 years 
and last for a further 20 years. For many pension contracts risk is merely a function of 
investment policy, but for those pension contracts that involve indirect investment via an 
insurance company or a fund manager(s) or indeed where the members pension is funded 
by the purchase of an annuity, there are other third party risks. For instance, the outcome 
of a contract taken out with an insurance company is in no small part dependant on the 
continued existence of that company’s business (albeit in perhaps a different legal form). 
It is difficult for those entering contracts with an insurance company to know the nature 
of other contracts which may (in distress situations) take precedence in the distribution of 
investment returns (as in the Equitable Life Case), or whether contracts are written based 
on assumptions about longevity which are false (as in the Britannic Insurance case 
(Guardian Newspapers, 7/1/03). Insurance companies are also exposed to uncertainty 
where the statistical distribution of outcomes is not known.  Indeed given uncertainty the 
long run survival of insurance companies is puzzling.  Profitable insurance contracts 
cannot be written for something that is certain, but equally so for an event that is 
uncertain. 
 
While pension fund trustees may consider direct investment using a selected fund 
manager or a number of fund managers a more “hands on” approach which gives them 
greater involvement and control, counter-party risks remain. Consider the situation where 
the primary fund manager invests scheme monies in a fund operated by yet another third 
party fund manager (e.g. an Irish fund manager might  invest in Far East equities via a 
Far East equity fund operated by an overseas fund manager). The pension scheme now 
has in addition to the counter – party risk associated with the primary fund manager, the 
risk associated with this additional third party.   
 
Many schemes whilst using the direct investment approach, fund members pensions on 
retirement by purchase of an annuity rather than paying the pension directly out of the 
scheme. Until the difficulties of Equitable Life the inherent risk in this for the members 
would have been seen as theoretical only. That view is changing. 
 
Perhaps the greatest risk, which scheme trustees have to contend with, is likely to arise 
from the quality of management in both the primary insurance/fund management 
providers and the various sub- providers. It is very difficult to judge the nature of these 
risks but they nonetheless exist. 
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Investment Strategies: 
 
 
As at end 2001, the portfolio of assets invested in by pension funds was as shown in 
Table (3).  This table shows that little more than 25% of the total funds under 
management were invested in fixed interest stocks and cash instruments. Less than 10% 
was invested in property whilst over 60% was invested on the stock market.  Given recent 
financial history – three years of falling stock markets and market volatility stock market 
investments have proved very risky. It would be interesting to survey pension fund 
members on what their preferred investment choice would be – the low risk return with 
little or no surprises (pleasant or unpleasant) on retirement, or stock market speculation 
with the consequent highs and lows that this entails. It is probably fair to say that few 
employees, if they thought about it, would be happy to invest as much as 60% of their 
pension contributions in the stock market and increase the risk of being seriously under 
provided for at a time when their earnings capacity is nil or at best very vulnerable.  
Pension funds are concerned with retirement income provision, based on a set of pre-
defined criteria including projected returns on capital invested. They should not be 
concerned primarily with speculation. It is puzzling therefore why their underlying  
investment strategies, incorporate practices which could potentially diminish even the 
original capital amounts invested? 
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Table (3) 
Asset Portfolios by Irish pension Funds 
 
             Asset Type Market Value –euro millions                    % 
Asset Distribution by Sector               
Irish   
Fixed Interest – Government. 1,989.8 3.9 
Fixed Interest – Corporate 299.2 0.6 
Indexed Linked 137.8 0.3 
Equities – quoted 7,862.6 15.5 
Equities – unquoted 96.5 0.2 
Property 4,318.6 8.5 
Forestry 163.3 0.3 
Cash and cash instruments 967.5 1.9 
Other 364.2 0.7 
Total 16.199.5 32.0 
Non – Irish – Eurozone ex Ireland   
Fixed Interest – Government 6,729.3 13.3 
Fixed Interest – Corporate 729.4 1.4 
Equities 7615.2 15.0 
Property 28.4 0.1 
Cash and cash instruments 520.2 1.0 
Other 89.7 0.2 
Total 15,712.2 31.0 
Non Irish – World ex Eurozone   
Fixed Interest – Government 924.5 1.8 
Fixed Interest – Corporate 191.7 0.4 
Equities – UK 4,312.8 8.5 
Equities US 8,240.8 16.3 
Equities Europe – Ex Eurozone 1,560.2 3.1 
Equities Pacific Basin (ex Japan) 1,488.9 2.9 
Equities Japan 1,426.1 2.8 
Equities other overseas 91.9 0.2 
Property 113.9 0.2 
Cash and struments 86.1 0.2 
Other 270.1 0.5 
Total 18,706.9 37.0 
Overall Total 50,618.5 100 
 
IAPF Asset Allocation survey. 
 
Industry figures for pension fund performance over the period 1990 to 2002 are even 
more telling.  
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Figure (2) 
 Irish Pension Fund Returns 
Year By Year
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Source: Mercer Investment Consulting. 
 
This pattern clearly reflects the heavy weighting in riskier assets (particularly equities). 
For retirees in the mid – 90’s this paid off, but not so in 2002. An annuity pension based 
on the value of the accumulated fund would be much larger in 1999 than currently.  
Consider the plight of a D.C. scheme retiree in 2002, who perhaps had made significant 
additional pension contributions (AVC’s) in the 2 to three years prior to retirement.  
 
The current situation is further exacerbated by the fact that during the three years 1999 to 
2002 the cost of purchasing annuities rose by of the order of 25% due to falling interest 
rates. The inverse relationship one would have expected between equity values and 
interest rates failed to materialise, resulting in a simultaneous reduction in pension fund 
assets and an increase in pension fund liabilities.  In the mid – 90’s many DB schemes 
were experiencing pension surpluses. Reports are that currently, as many as 40% of these 
same schemes could be underfunded.  
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Industry figures for returns per asset category for the 5 and 10 years to end 2002 are as 
follows; 
 
Table (4) 
Returns for Different Asset Categories 
 
Asset Category 5 years -  % p.a. 10 years - % p.a. 
Irish Equities 3.1 15 
Eurozone Equities -13.1 (over 3 years) N/A 
UK Equities -1.2 10.5 
North American Equities -10.5 13.3 
Japanese equities -4.1 1.8 
Pacific basin (ex Japan) -5.4 7.3 
Bonds 7.7 10.2 
Property 18.5 15 
Cash 4.2 5.7 
 
Source: Mercer Investment Consulting. 
 
 
Of  the 50618.5m.Euro of pension fund monies under management, up to 4,500m is 
managed through the managed fund route i.e. where fund managers establish investment 
funds to invest in a mix of all asset categories  and the pension  funds buy units in these 
funds.  The performance of the pension fund monies is therefore dependent on the 
performance of the managed fund. Table (4) shows in the 10 years to end 2002, the 
average return per annum for managed funds was 11.4, little over 1% greater than going 
the relatively more safer bond option. Over 5 years the managed fund % is 2.1 as 
compared with a bond % of  7.7. Over 3 years the comparison is –4.4% (managed fund), 
7.5% (bonds). When one considers the importance of  pension income security and 
absence of risk to the our retiring population,  and taking into account that a secure bond 
return coupled with tax relief yields an attractive average annual return (taking average 
tax relief over the 10 year period of 30% p.a and a bond return of 10.2% p.a., the 
combined return exceeds 40%), it is hard, based on this experience to rationalise the 
enormous  investment bias in favour of equities.  
 
Many varying theories have been put forward as to what constitutes the optimum 
investment strategy for a pension fund. Most however agree that in this context, there are 
differences between D.C. schemes and D.B. schemes.  Davis (1996,p.22) states that  
 
“When pursuing a strategy of significant investment in equities and property, 
given the risk of shortfall at least in the short term, there has to be a form of risk 
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shifting from old to young members of the plan. The young accept occasional 
under-funding for their future rights (when asset prices fall) in return for lower 
premia while the old continue to receive unchanged pensions”.  
 
Blake (1994b Page numbers) maintains that it makes sense for immature DB 
schemes to invest mainly in equities, for mature funds to invest in a mix of equities and 
bonds and funds which are winding up to invest mainly in bonds. 
Tepper (1992 page number ) however questions whether returns on equities are 
statistically independent from year to year. If they are, a long series of bad returns could 
lead to significant real losses from equities even over a long- term horizon relevant to 
pension funds.  In the context of market performance between 2000 and 2002, this is not 
comforting.   
 
Apart from asset returns the main variable in determining returns to contract beneficiaries 
(pension contracts and Life Insurance contracts) is the level of charges. Fund 
management is a multi – billion euro industry world wide. Fund management charges are  
calculated as a percentage of the funds under management rather than return generated. 
The current applicable rates in Ireland for a fund under  5 million Euro is of the order of 
1%.  For funds up to 30m. Euro the rate is of the order of ¾ of 1%. Fees for funds greater 
than this are negotiated individually. The layered investment system outlined in Table 1 
has potential to increase these fees further – for example if the primary fund manager 
places a block of client funds in a third party investment fund, the pension fund faces two 
separate  fund management charges.  Evidence from the UK shows that charges, 
particularly for individual pension schemes can vary between 8 and 29 per cent of fund 
value (Office of Fair Trading, 1997, p. 74) 
 
 In the current market environment, and particularly given the proliferation of managed, 
index and consensus funds, it is likely that fund managers are coming under increasing 
pressure to demonstrate value added by them to the investment process. 
 
 
WHO BEARS THE  RISK? 
 
 
Who bears what risk and the extent of that risk in a pension fund system, is a function of 
whether it is a defined benefit scheme or a defined contribution scheme. It is also a 
function of the institutional arrangements, which collect pension contributions and make 
eventual pension payments to pensioners. In a defined contribution plan, workers 
contributions are specified. Future benefits depend on future net rates of return, the 
duration of working and retirement periods and annuity prices on reaching retirement 
age. This investment, disability and longevity risk is borne by the worker. In defined 
benefit plans the pension formula is determined in advance although it may depend on 
years of employment and salary over a certain period (e.g. last three years of 
employment). In effect, the employer undertakes to pay members a pension related in 
some manner to career earnings. The member may or may not be required to contribute to 
the scheme depending on the scheme rules and provisions. The employer commits to 
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cover any shortfall in funding (becoming a very topical issue – e.g. BT  has committed to 
providing Stg.1.6bn to cover its’ pension deficit – likewise Chubb are planning to make 
additional contributions to it’s scheme of up to Stg15m per year over a 15 year period,- 
F.T. 10/2/03) The principal risk to a member of a defined benefit scheme is that the 
sponsor- company may not pay pensions as envisioned in employment contracts.  This 
could arise through fraud, as in the Maxwell case, or more likely through corporate 
failure, as in the Enron case (F.T. 3/2/01). Other risks can arise where the sponsoring 
employer though profitable and solvent is wound up in order to avoid additional 
payments into the fund (as in the case Maersk an international shipping group, F.T. 
18/12/02).  Effectively these sorts of risk arise because the employer does not contribute 
sufficient funds to an externally managed fund.  There are also risks for the member if 
pensions are provided via an annuity, -the stream of pension payments (annuity 
payments) are dependent on the financial health of the annuity provider.  Until the 
financial problems at Equitable Life (Guardian Newspapers, 13/1/2003), it was generally 
supposed that such payments streams were without risk.   
 
 
 
 
What are  the Likely Effects? 
 
Data from the 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey shows that the current 
income of households headed by a retired person is largely made up of the State 
pension, even though there has been growth in the relative importance of 
occupational pensions over the period 1987 – 1999/00.  Hence income of the 
currently retired are unlikely to have been affected by stock market falls.  Future 
retirees are unlikely to be as fortunate. 
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Income from Pensions as a Proportion of Total Income Per cent 
 
Sources of Pension Income 1987 1994/95 1999/00 
All State Social Welfare Sources for ages 65-74 43     37 47.9 
All State Social Welfare Sources  for ages 75+ 44 40.9 48.3 
Occupational pensions  for ages 65-74 15.7 20.8 23.5 
Occupational Pensions for ages 75+ 16.3 26.8 20.6 
 
There were over 1000 households in the category 65-74 and over 500 in the category 75+ for 
all years examined. Source: Household Budget Surveys. Table taken from Coinnell and 
Stewart in  Hughes and Stewart (ed.) (forthcoming) 
 
For existing retired persons average disclosed income from other sources is 
modest, reflecting relatively low financial and other assets. Although this data is 
highly skewed as a small number of individuals have a large source of income 
from financial and other assets.  The most important asset of elderly households is 
housing (85% of households headed by a person aged 75+ own their own house). 
Housing  has increased dramatically in value over the last three years compared 
with a falling stock market. Thus the wealth of the current generation of retired 
persons has been largely protected by rising house prices. Housing will not 
continue to be a source of increased wealth to the same extent to future retired 
persons. 
 
It is likely that the State Old Age Pension will remain the primary source of 
income to future retired persons.  In most economies even though stock markets 
have fallen by up to 50% in some cases, GDP growth has remained low or static.  
Hence Government tax revenues and the ability to finance social welfare pensions 
(and pensions of public sector employees) has not been affected as adversely as 
private sector pension arrangements.  Recently the Society of Actuaries in 
Ireland estimated that a  person earning the average industrial  wage in December 
2002, would need to save 7% of their income for 40 years in order to obtain a 
pension of half their current earnings.  However this accumulated sum will 
replace just 18% of current income, while the State Old Age Pension is assumed 
to replace 34% of current income.   The estimated  replacement rate of 18% from 
a private sector pension, is necessarily uncertain as it depends on future 
investment returns, management charges and tax regimes.  Furthermore pension 
income from defined contribution type schemes may be fixed at the time of 
retirement, but the State Old Age Pension is likely to be adjusted in the future 
both for inflation and changes in living standards. 
 
The private sector pension system is very important. A substantial fraction of the 
labour force is dependent on this system to deliver pension income. The pension 
system plays a key role in the allocation of savings.  But the  pension system also 
attracts considerable tax relief. But given the relatively low flows of income from 
occupational pension schemes compared with the State scheme the question must 
be asked are these tax expenditures good value for money?  In a future investment 
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environment characterised by low returns and low interest rates, accumulating a 
lump sum over a 40 year period  to fund a pension over 20 or more years which 
replaces half or two-thirds of pre-retirement earnings is likely to be beyond the 
resources of most people.  In order to ensure the viability of a pension system  
(whether funded or unfunded) which can deliver pension income, there are likely 
to be changes to retirement ages and changes to allow various combinations of 
income from part time work and pension income - a development sometimes 
referred to as the 4th pillar.  A recent UK Green Paper suggested pension reforms 
including tax changes, to encourage participation in the work force after the 
normal retirement age.  Such policies are likely to become part of the solution to 
securing future incomes of retired persons in Ireland. 
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
Pension systems are subject to considerable risk and uncertainty as a function of both 
their investment policy and the institutional structure of pension fund provision. The 
increasing complexity of investment contracts and the use of multiple investment routes 
and financial intermediaries, whilst facilitating diversification of investment risk may  
increase both costs and counterparty risk(e.g. Equitable Life). 
 
Irish Pension funds hold disproportionately high levels of equities, which could lead to 
crisis situations if falling equity markets persist. Industry figures over the period 1990 to 
2002, suggest that bond returns were only marginally lower overall than returns from 
managed funds, for a fraction of the risk. 
 
The degree to which pension funds particularly D.C. schemes should speculate at all is 
questionable (particularly where the work force is older), given the potential downside 
for individuals at a time when their income earning potential is at its most vulnerable.  
The combination  of tax relief and a secure bond return might be regarded by many as 
more than acceptable particularly when viewed in the context of the current environment. 
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Even though returns have on average been negative over the last three years, costs 
of managing all pension schemes have been positive, as they are partly 
determined by funds under management not fund performance. For example with 
the new PRSA scheme management charges can be as high as 5% of funds 
contributed and a further 1% of funds managed. Charges for what are described as 
‘non-standard’ PRSAs can be even higher. Pension management charges can be 
even higher for individual schemes such as AVC schemes. It is easy to see that 
with falling or projected stationary equity markets, and low returns on 
Government debt, the main benefits to pension policy holders comes from the 
State through tax relief.  Although as holders of equity linked Special Savings 
Accounts have discovered, even with a State contribution of 25% of the amount 
invested, returns may still be negative. 
 18
 19
 
 
 
 
 
 
